Product Hopping
Michael Carrier
DOI:https://doi.org/10.5912/jcb795
Abstract:
One of the most pressing issues in antitrust law involves “product hopping.” A brand-name pharmaceutical company switches from one version of a drug (say, capsule) to another (say, tablet). The concern with this conduct is that some of these switches offer only a trivial medical benefit but significantly impair generic competition.
The antitrust analysis of product hopping is nuanced. In the U.S., it implicates the intersection of antitrust law, patent law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and state drug product selection laws. In fact, the behavior is even more complex because it involves uniquely complicated markets characterized by buyers (insurance companies, patients) who are different from the decision-makers (physicians).
This article introduces the relevant U.S. laws and regulatory frameworks before exploring the five litigated cases.
Keywords:en ,